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MUNICIPAL LEGISLATIVE BARRIERS TO
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Municipal ordinances having the possible effect of restricting a free market are
more voluminous than any other single type of barrier legislation. The more than
7,000 municipalities in the United States, not to mention other local subdivisions of
states possessing a measure of legislative power, have all adopted ordinances which
intentionally or unintentionally operate in one way or another as barriers to the
unfettered economic operation of the market within their areas. This vast volume
of local legislation certainly calls for consideration aside from its counterparts in
state and federal laws. The term barrier in this context is descriptive of a broad
result only, and is not used in the sense of evaluating the legislation as desirable or
undesirable. Throughout this discussion there will be no attempt made to deter-
mine as a matter of political philosophy or economic policy what types of local
ordinances may be regarded as justified or unjustified. Regardless, however, of its
merits, there are certain fundamental principles relating to the power of municipal
corporations to which legislation of this type must conform if it is to be sustained
by the courts. Many of these principles constitute Achilles' heels by which ordi-
nances that are considered undesirable can be legally attacked.
The history of local ordinances relating to economic affairs traces from the
earliest of municipal legislative activities.' Even in the Middle Ages some of the
principal activities of municipal authorities dealt with efforts to control matters of
trade and industry, particularly with respect to importing and exporting, matters of
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competition, control of price, quality, etc. In many by-laws the admitted and
avowed purpose was to control competition in favor of the local inhabitants.2 The
establishment and regulation of public markets, a power of cities having its roots
in the earliest organized societies, was one of the early functions of the English
borough.
While the sphere of economic regulation is not at all a new topic for the con-
sideration of municipal legislative bodies, the scope and volume of local laws of
this character is constantly increasing. Investigation of many building codes reveals
that their specifications operate as barriers to the use of particular types of materials
or particular merchandising methods. For instance, the code standard for the
thickness of plaster lathe as an element in fireproof construction may be so designed
as in effect to exclude the use of metal lathe. Provisions of the Chicago building
codes restrict the use of such lumber substitutes as hardboard and insulation board.
These limitations are accomplished by specifying the products which are satisfac-
tory under the fire laws instead of admitting any product which meets a specific
fire test. Because of different construction principles employed in the prefabrication
of dwellings, building codes will often, in effect if not by design, impede the use of
this new type of construction.3 The specific content or administrative operation of
many of the existing municipal electrical codes, plumbing codes, etc., also furnish
examples of provisions accidentally or purposely preferring one kind of equipment
or method of distribution over another.4 It has been pointed out that the plumbing
code of a Pennsylvania city requires all registered plumbers to pay a fee of one dollar
a fixture for every installation. Every non-resident plumber, wishing to work in the
city, must register with the Board of Health and pay a registration fee of $25-$5o
for each job to be performed in the city. There is some indication of a trend at the
present time toward promulgation under local police power of general codes reg-
ulating particularly local service occupations.5
In St. Louis, Missouri, and Dayton, Ohio, sticker ordinances have operated as
effective deterrents to the sale of plumbing fixtures by mail-order houses. These
ordinances provide in general that in order to secure inspection approval, all plumb-
ing fixtures installed must have affixed a sticker secured from the city. The firm
selling the fixtures must also make a report indicating the place of installation of
every piece of equipment which it sells. This requirement is little more than a
21 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) §65; 1 id. (rev. ed. 1940) §941.
8 See State ex rel. v. Yoter, 65 Ohio App. 492, 30 N. E. (2d) 558 (x939); see also Matill v. City of
Chattanooga, 232 S. W. (2d) 201 (Tenn. 1940).
'in the building trades investigation of the United States Department of justice, numerous instances
of "barriers" in favor of local dealers and labor have been uncovered. Dean, Some Problems Arising
in the Enforcement of the Anti-Trust Laws, in MuNiciP.AriTIs AND THE LAW IN ACTIoN (Nat. Inst.
Mun. Law Officers, 1939) 273-280.
'Report of Committee on Social and Economic Regulation of Industry, in MuNIcIPALIMES AND 7IE
LAw im AcnioN (Nat. Inst. of Mun. Law Officers, 1940).
' Address of Corwin Edwards, Restraints in Building Codes, Central Housing Discussion Papers
G : 1940 Series. See Dayton, Ohio ordinances No. 14939 and No. 25052, litigated in Dayton v.
Bohachek, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 417 (Ohio App. 1938); Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, Ohio Com-
mon Pleas, Montgomery County, No. 88186, 2940 (unreported).
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time-consuming irritation for the local plumbing trade, but represents a major diffi-
culty to the doing of business by a mail-order house. The Green River type ordi-
nance, prohibiting house-to-house canvassing without the consent of the individual
householder, is perhaps the most drastic local regulation directed at a particular
method of doing business.1 Municipal chain store taxes are also well-known ex-
amples of this situation. Recently, in New Jersey as well as elsewhere, local
merchants demanded municipal legislative protection against the supermarkets
which are a common phenomenon in every city.8
Product favoritism in Seattle took the form of legislative aid to liquid as against
solid fuel. In Chicago, milk control legislation has even been directed against the
use of paper containers in favor of the use of the standard glass bottle? Many
ordinances, ostensibly adopted for the purpose of protecting the local public health
by requiring inspection of the milk supply, have had an extraterritorial operation
which discriminates against non-residents? Furthermore, taxes or regulations
affecting not only hawkers and peddlers, and more recently solicitors and can-
vassers, but also such businesses as bakeries, barber shops, beauty parlors, food
stores, amusement facilities, cleaners and dyers, dairies and milk distributors, cloth-
ing and department stores, and other occupations and industries, may actually be
designed to operate to the advantage of local concerns as against non-resident
competitors.
Ordinances of market-barrier significance may thus operate either geograph-
ically, in an attempt to grant a preference to the local market, or non-geographically,
in an attempt to discriminate in favor of one commodity, method of doing business,
or class of dealers. Inasmuch as a systematic survey throughout the whole United
States of all local codes and ordinances operating as municipal market barriers is
impractical, the study here presented makes no pretense of such comprehensive
treatment." Enough has been indicated, however, to illustrate the scope of local
ordinances that may have the effect of impeding the ordinary economic operation
of local markets. Further instances will appear in the ensuing discussion, and can
also be found in other articles in this symposium.
Although no position is here taken with respect to the justification or desirability
of any particular ordinances operating as market barriers, nevertheless it will per-
haps be useful to suggest both sides of the picture from the local point of view. On
7 Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456 (1936); Green River v. Fuller Brush
Co., 65 F. (2d) zi2 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933). Local legislation in two New York cities has been directed
against peddling in a particular business. People v. Kuc, 272 N. Y. 72, 4 N. E. (2d) 939 (936)
(newspaper); Dugan Bros v. City of New York, 7 N. Y- S. (2d) 162 (938) (bakery products). Both
ordinances were invalidated.
8 See the ordinance of the City of Camden, New Jersey, set forth in Great A&P Tea Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs of Camden, 4 A. (2d) x6 (N. J. i939).
' Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 35 F. Supp. 451 (N. D. Ill. 1940); Ex-Cell-O Corp. vw
City of Chicago, 115 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
" See, e.g., City of Rockford v. Hey, 366 Il. 526, 9 N. E. (2d) 37 (1937); (1938) 36 MIcn. L
RFv. 850.
"Sikes and Parrish, Municipal Trade Barriers (1940) 16 INn. L. J. 22o and Note (1940) id. 247, at-
tempt a comprehensive analysis of Indiana ordinances.
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the one hand, market-barrier legislation may be condemned as an evil tending
toward creation of unfair discrimination with respect to areas or products and
tending toward disruption of national economic unity. On the other hand, a good
case can be made out for justifying some legislation of this type. Out-of-city or
non-resident dealers entering the local market area receive the benefit of local pro-
tection of the market and enjoy the benefit of many local municipal services without
in either case contributing any quid pro quo to the local treasury.12 The resident
dealers with whom they compete under the resulting advantageous conditions
naturally demand some equalizing factor to offset the local burdens incumbent
upon them.
In addition there are other circumstances in which a regulation designed to set
up a protective barrier around a local market area may, from one point of view,
be entirely justified. One example of this is the following actual problem which
confronted a small Missouri town about three years ago. The local used-car market
was being demoralized by certain dealers from the nearby large metropolitan areas
who would ship large quantities of used cars into the town for sale at cut-throat
prices. The business methods employed were also questionable; the out-of-the-city
concern would send large quantities of cars on consignment to an unknown and
irresponsible dealer who would rent temporary quarters and might abandon the
business overnight, leaving little or no trace as to his whereabouts. The local used-
car dealers suffering from the effects of this competition demanded municipal
legislation in their interest. Clearly, no legislation in the form of an anti-dumping
law could properly or effectively be adopted which would have the open and avowed
purpose of prohibiting this practice. Nor would the imposition of a larger fee for
a non-resident dealer be a valid solution. The device suggested was the use of the
local power to protect the public from fraud in business transactions. As an incident
of the police power the local city council had authority to prescribe reasonable
regulations designed to insure that the purchaser of a used car was not getting
a stolen vehicle. In order to defray the cost of investigation of used cars offered
for sale, a nominal license fee could be charged. It is also arguable that it would
have been reasonable to have required the dealers to register with the local authorities
any used car brought in for sale from outside the local area and to withhold any
sale of such cars for a short period of time in order to permit a police check on the
documents of title. The small profit differential and the temporary character of
the business of the consignment-sale dealer were such that the nuisance of these
rather minor regulations was sufficient to discourage the offending business practice
and to reach the desired result13
", The New York City sales tax cases are a recognition of the liability of non-residents to pay a
share of the cost of local government in the face of the long claimed "immunity" of non-residents from
'ocal tax burdens under the commerce clause. See Chanler, The Commerce Clause and Municipal
Vaxation, in MUNICIPAL7ES AND THE LAw n; AcnToN (Nat. Inst. Mun. Law Officers, 1940).
"National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, Report No. 30, Opinion Bull. No. 3 (1937). Cl.
3rate v. Ernst, 297 N. W. 24 (Minn. 1941), holding invalid as discriminatory against non-residents a
statute which required a bond and $5 fee for all used cars brought into the state; Motor Trading Co.
v. Ingels, xro P. (2d) 132 (Cal. App. 1941), holding similarly with respect to an analogous statute.
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Legal justification for local taxation is the power derived from the state by an
express constitutional or statutory authority to raise revenue. The fundamental
basis for local exercise of regulatory authority over economic matters, however, is
the police power to protect the public from fraud and dishonest practices. Local,
like state, power to regulate business has been for some time restricted to a direct
relation to the protection of health, morals, or safety, or to general regulation of
business affected with the public interest. Since the case of Nebbia v. People of New
York, 4 the permissible scope of state and local economic regulation of industry
has been much expanded.'8 Thus local police power has been recognized as ex-
tending to regulation of unfair competition, and even to combinations in restraint
of trade.' 6 While municipal legislation may be considered together with state legis-
lation of a comparable nature for application of the common tests of constitution-
ality, local laws are subjected to additional judicial scrutiny in view of the limited
powers of cities, territorially and otherwise, and of the authority of the courts to
pass upon the reasonableness of ordinances as exertions of delegated powers."
Because of the definite limits to municipal authority, in passing upon the validity
of local ordinances courts determine the scope of the charter power possessed by
the local authority, whether that power has been properly pursued, whether the
matter regulated is one of local as distinguished from state concern, and whether
there is inconsistency with state law. And while the motives of neither local nor
state legislative bodies may be inquired into in determining the legality of legisla-
tion, nevertheless the broad scope of local ordinances enacted pursuant to implied
powers affords room for a rather broad consideration of the general economic effect
and justification of restrictive legislation.'8
The following discussion of legal problems receiving the attention of the courts
with respect to barrier legislation is believed to be representative of the whole situa-
tion. Acquaintance with these problems, it should be frankly stated, is based on
the writers' personal day-to-day contact with and observation of such ordinances,
and the questions presented to city attorneys for litigation or for the advice of city
administrators and councilmen faced with the reasonable or unreasonable legislative
demands of interested groups. Although representative of but a small segment of
the whole, a great many problems are presented to the courts each year requiring
a consideration of the principles involved in the legality of such local ordinances as
have a barrier effect.
Altogether these principles number five: first, the relation of the ordinance to
the police or revenue powers; second, the reasonableness of the ordinance and
the extent of judicial inquiry into economic factors in this connection; third,
the effect of the ordinance on interstate commerce; fourth, the effect of the ordi-
2, 91 U. S. 502 (r934).
' Kelly-Sullivan, Inc. v. Moss, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 491 (1940), 'noted (r940) 9 GEo. WASH. L. lRv.
242. "L See note 5, supra.1
'DILLON, MUNICIiAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. r91) §6oo.
" Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); LeFeber v. West Allis, ii9 Wis. 6o8, 97 N. W. 203
(903).
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nance as to non-residents; fifth, the effect of the ordinance with respect to extra-
territorial operation. In addition, the application of the privileges and immunities
clauses of state and federal constitution may be involved.' Fundamentally, all local
legislation of this type relates to some phase of either of two basic municipal powers,
namely: police and revenue. The revenue measures adopted for the purpose of
raising funds may have a more important incidental regulatory effect, but never-
theless, as revenue measures, they must be justified under the constitutional or the
express legislative authority to tax. Police legislation is directly designed to regulate
individual conduct and may relate to either express or implied power. Regulatory
measures may involve license fees which sometimes resemble revenue exactions, but
they must, as distinguished from taxes, bear a reasonable relation to the cost of the
police power regulation involved.20 If the collections from the regulatory license fees
grossly exceed that cost, the court may declare that the actual intent is revenue-
producing and the measure will accordingly be held invalid in the absence of the
power to tax.
The problem thus raised as to the source of the municipal power exercised in a
given instance is illustrated by two recently litigated cases. A Los Angeles ordi-
nance attempting to tax department stores was held to be based on a classification
too indefinite for the purpose of taxation,2 1 while an ordinance imposing a $25
license tax by the City of Seattle on each dealer in solid fuel plus a $15 fee for each
fuel truck used in excess of one was invalidated as a discrimination between solid
fuel and liquid fuel dealers.22  The Seattle solid fuel tax measure was claimed by
the municipal authorities to be levied as a police regulatory measure and therefore
not required to be based on the same kind of classification that would be required
for a revenue measure. This distinction was held immaterial in that case, but it
has been treated as significant in many instances.
While there are innumerable examples of local regulatory measures which oper-
ate as market barriers through non-geographic discriminations, the problem is one
for the legislature, unless the measure can be established as arbitrary or capricious
"o Since the case of Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1886), the privileges and
immunities clause has been of practically no importance in federal court decisions in this connection.
This is not correspondingly true of state litigation, however. Cf. New York v. Roberts, 171 TI. S. 658
(1898), and State v. Cohen, 133 Me. 293, 177, Ad. 403 (1935). Since the decision in the New York
City sales tax case, however, McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U. S. 33 (940), it is probable
that litigants will again seek to rely heavily on a privileges and immunities argument.
" The nature of a license fee not charged for revenue purposes is an assessment of the cost of
regulation against the object regulated. It is therefore an incident of the police power and unless
expressly authorized in the form of a revenue-producing fee it must bear a reasonable relation to the
cost of regulation. A court, however, will not examine mathematically the exact allocation of cost
on any accounting basis, but will give a presumption of validity to the assessment charged as a fee
unless it can be shown that the charge has no relation to the cost at all. See In re opinion to the
House of Representatives, 5 A. (2d) 455 (R. 1. 1939); 1 COoLEY, TAx-nON (4th ed. 1924) §27; el.
Ex parte Holt, 74 Okla. 226, 178 Pac. 260 (18); Atkins v. Philips, 8 So. 429 (Fla. 189o).
" Barker Bros. v. City of Los Angeles, 5o Cal. (2d) 6o3, 76 P. (2d) 97 (5938); Cf. City of Chicago
v. Nechter, 183 II. 104, 55 N. E. 707 (1899).
22 Pierson v. City of Seattle, 559 Wash. 217, 90 P. (2d) 1020 (1939); see also S. S. Kresge Co. v.
Couzens, inIra note 44.
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or definitely directed against one group of persons for the private advantage of
another and without any real relation to the public interest. The fact that the
ordinance may in operation work to the advantage of one product or method of
doing business and to the disadvantage of another, is of no legal consequence if the
public interest in the exercise of the local police power presents a reasonable relation
to the subject matter of the regulation. Here, as in any local law adopted pursuant
to an implied power, the question of reasonableness is one of law.
The best known contemporary local tax ordinances having barrier effects are
undoubtedly the local tax laws directed against chain stores. These ordinances have
been adopted in a variety of forms. They have been based in some instances on a
classification of business according to its gross revenue, whether received from busi-
ness done within or without the city.23 Some have been graduated according to
the number of units in the whole chain operating within the city,24 or in some
situations the number of units operating in the system, wherever situated.25 Others,
with an eye to the "serve yourself" systems, have been based upon a classification
of the method by which particular chain store operators conduct their business.26
In any case, these ordinances have usually been designed, more or less frankly, to
equalize the positions of the single-store dealer and the chain operator. They are
practically all revenue measures as distinguished from police power license fee
exactions. They, therefore, involve either a constitutional power to tax or an express
legislative delegation of the power to raise revenue by taxation or occupational
license fees.
In these cases three general problems, in addition to the obvious one of the
existence of the power to tax for revenue purposes, have been considered. Since a
tax directed against a chain store business must involve a classification in order to
reach the desired subject, the relation of the classification adopted in the local ordi-
nance, as compared to the differentiation made for tax purposes by state legislation,
creates a problem. A further problem exists by virtue of the fact that any classifica-
tion for the purpose of a revenue tax must be non-discriminatory and based on a
reasonable difference in fact between the classes taxed and those not taxed, so that
the tax law may have a uniform operation. Finally, although the power to tax is
granted in unlimited form and with no restriction as to amount, nevertheless, the
power to tax does not carry with it the power to prohibit a lawful business. Any
tax legislation, therefore, must not in its operation be confiscatory.
As a general rule it has been held that a city has no power to adopt a basis of
classification for tax purposes different from that which has been established by the
state itself. If, on the other hand, the state has made no classification as to the
subject matter to be taxed, then the local action will be upheld without reference to
any state system. In some cases, the courts, in order to sustain the municipal law,
" City of Atlanta v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 200 S. E. 712 (Ga. 1938).
" Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. City of St. Louis, 341 Mo. 62, io6 S. W. (2d) 435 (1937).
"SGreat A&P Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, x89 Ga. 458, 6 S. E. (2d) 320 (939); City Council
of Augusta v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 189 Ga. 6x8, 7 S. E. (2d) 181 (1939).
"' So of the Camden ordinance described in note 37, infra.
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have gone rather far to establish a distinction between the state and local classifica-
tions of the subject matter of the tax. The ordinance of St. Louis, Missouri, pro-
viding for graduation of a license-fee tax according to the number of stores, is an
example of an ordinance invalidated because of its relation to the classification
established by state law. The state law had provided for local authority to tax and
regulate the occupation of merchants and manufacturers and to graduate the amount
in proportion to the sales made by the merchant or manufacturer during the year
next preceding any fixed date. Considering the validity of the ordinance in the
case of Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. City of St. Louis,"7 the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that the state law with respect to the method of classification for the
purpose of a license was mandatory and not directory, and the local method of
classification inconsistent therewith.
Other similar examples may be cited. A power to tax in proportion to sales has
been held not to authorize a tax based on the floor space used in the business2 So
also has the power to tax single occupations been held not to authorize a local
ordinance attempting their subdivision into various phases; thus the business of con-
tractors generally, as provided by state law, cannot be divided by local ordinances
into the trades of brick mason, plastering contractor, roofing contractor, electrical
contractor, etc?9
On the other hand, in the case of Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery Co. 0 the
court held valid a local classification based on the number of stores in excess of one,
as compared to the state law authorizing the tax but making no such classification.
The court held that the city had not, by its local ordinance, attempted a subdivision
of the class created by the state, but that it had created the entirely new classification
of chain store merchants. In this case also, it is interesting to note, the court in-
voked, as against the charge of discrimination, the principle that the party assailing
the classification must show that the business discriminated against is precisely the
same as that included in the class which is alleged to be favored. Further examples
of the validity of a local classification, in the absence of a controlling state classifica-
tion, are Bradley v. Richmond,"' Williams v. Boiling Green, and Safeway Stores
v. PortlandP3 In the Safeway Stores case, charter authority to grant licenses with
the object of raising revenue or of regulation or both for any and all lawful acts,
things, or purposes, and to fix by ordinance the amount to be paid therefor and the
bases of revocation, was held sufficient to sustain an ordinance imposing an annual
license fee of $50 on each store of a chain in excess of 20, whereas a single store
was obliged to pay only $6.
It is a well-settled principle that the operation of a local tax law as a revenue
measure must be uniform on all persons in the same position? 4 As a corollary to
" Supra note 24.
"8 Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S. W. (2d) 195 (1935).
2 Norfolk v. Griffin Bros., x2o Va. 524, 91 S. E. 640 (I917).
sIo S. E. 318, nio A. L. R. 1195 (Va. 1937). 81227 U. S. 477 (1913)-
:2254 Ky. 1', 70 S. 'V. (2d) 967 (1934). 13 49 Ore. 581, 42 P. (2d) x62 (1935).
24 McQUsLsN, MUNucIPAL CoRPoRToNs (2d. ed. 1928) §2540.
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this principle, any classification for the purpose of taxation must bear a reasonable
relation to the facts and not arbitrarily discriminate between individuals identically
situated."1 It has been contended in several of the chain store tax cases that singling
out the chain stores for the purpose of taxation is an unconstitutional discrimination
against them as an ordinary means of business, not essentially different from any
other method of selling. It has been generally held, however, as against this con-
tention, that the different method of doing business is a sufficient differentiating
basis for the purpose of classification. Thus in the Saleway case this objection was
overruled by pointing out that:."
There is a real, recognized difference between a business carried on in one store and a
business operated by means of a chain of stores. Whether it is wise or expedient based
upon such difference to classify such chain stores in a class by themselves for the purpose
of levying a license tax is, as we understand, a legislative question to be determined by
the lawmakers.
A notable exception to this view is the opinion of the court in. the case of Great
A&P Tea Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Camden, N. Jff The Camden ordi-
nance, it is known, was directed against the supermarket. It was there held that the
imposition of a tax for revenue purposes upon self-service markets, as distinguished
from markets in which goods were sold by clerks, was an arbitrary discrimination
between persons engaged in the same business merely because one 'merchant chose
a method of making sales which another did not use. The leading case sustaining
chain store taxation by the state was distinguished in these words :13
The classification in question has not the slightest resemblance to classification predicated
upon a desire to adjust competition or economic inequalities between merchants sustained
in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosiean.
Similar to the chain store tax situation are other revenue taxes assessed on a basis
intending to discriminate against non-residents in favor of local dealers. While some
classification on this basis is permissible in order to equalize the tax burdens between
residents and non-residents doing business within the city, nevertheless, the distinction
must not reach the point of placing the non-resident at a disadvantage. If so, it will
be invalidated as an arbitrary classification.
The Camden supermarket case, already considered on the point of classification,
affords as well a good example of an ordinance condemned because confiscatory. The
tax imposed in that case was $io,ooo per year with a provision for a fine of $200 or
" City of Atlanta v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, supra note 23; and see also note 19,
supra. " Supra note 33, at 599, 42 P. (2d) at 169.
"
7 Supra note 8. The ordinance described the method of doing business which was to be taxed as
"self service in such a manner that purchasers are invited and permitted to make selections of food
or merchandise on open display and to place their selections for purchase into baskets, carts, or containers
provided by the seller, which are then taken to a counter where a cashier checks the merchandise, places
it in bags, cartons, or containers and receives a payment from the customer." The opinion of the
court describes the method of doing business of several of the chain stores operating supermarkets. In
addition to the A&P theso operators were Acme Markets, Inc., The Giant Tiger Corporation of Camden,
and The Food Fair, Inc.
" Supra note 8, at 18. Cf. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937).
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imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or both upon a conviction for violation of the
ordinance. In determining the question of validity the court admitted and considered
evidence as to the matters presented to the city council at a public hearing held
before the adoption of the ordinance. The court also observed that while there was
no limit on the amount of the tax which the city could levy, on the basis of the
present rate of profit a business of $i9,ooo a week would be required to meet the tax
and none of the stores in the chain did any such amount of business8 9 An ordinance
of Augusta, Georgia, was also recently invalidated on the ground that it was unrea-
sonable, arbitrary and confiscatory. The court held that the ordinance was not dis-
criminatory as a violation of the uniformity rule, but that it was confiscatory as
amounting to a destruction of a lawful business by use of the taxing power.40
Approach to the matter of confiscatory taxation from the point of view of reason-
ableness is to be found in the case of Great A&P Tea Co. v. City of Columbus?1
The court said:'
Legislative powers conferred by charter provisions upon a municipality are not to be
measured by the more extensive powers of the State legislature. ... One requirement
of all municipal ordinances is that they must be reasonable, and the courts must declare
void an ordinance found unreasonable. ... This record does not present a case where
the city has attempted under its police power to regulate- the business affected by the tax
ordinance.... While the city produced evidence which tended to show that the increase
of chain stores in Columbus had had the effect of driving a much larger number of
independent stores out of business, yet such evidence could not possibly illustrate any
issue which the court is called upon to decide in the present case.... We do not mean
to imply, however, that the receipts and the profits of the store, standing alone, although
the tax completely consumes such profits, will suffice to show that the tax is unreasonable
and void. But proof that the tax consumes the entire profits of the stores, coupled with
evidence of the prevailing conditions in the city as a whole, showing that these profits
are equal to the average in similar businesses, will demand a finding that the ordinance
is unreasonable.
Thus although the power to tax is expressly granted, the above limitation on the
manner of its exercise presents a question for judicial inquiry into a kind of "reason-
ableness" usually permissible where the ordinance does not follow a specific formula
prescribed by statute but represents in effect a choice of means. As previously indi-
cated, the question of the reasonableness of ordinances as an exercise of existing
delegated power constitutes a second legal principle to be considered in weighing
the legality of municipal barrier legislation. The doctrines adhered to by the courts
in the administration of this principle are these: If an ordinance is adopted pursuant
to a specific delegation of power from the legislature and precisely carries into
effect the power granted, the local law will be accorded the same presumption of
validity as is the state law itself; judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of the ordi-
nance is precluded. The only matter open for judicial review in such a case is the
"' See digest of brief for the city in the case of The Great A&P Tea Co. v. Atlantic City, N. J., in
the New Jersey Supreme Court, (1939) 4 MumciPAL LAw J. 21.
City Council of Augusta v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., supra note 25.
"Supra note 25. " Id. at 466, 468, 47 o , 6 S. E. (2d) at 324, 326.
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question of the existence of local power to adopt the ordinance and that of con-
stitutionality or conformity to general state law. If, on the other hand, the ordi-
nance is adopted pursuant to implied local power or represents a choice of means
for invoking an express power, then the reasonableness of the ordinance is a jus-
ticiable question 3 The judicial inquiry in this connection is a matter of determina-
tion of fact from the nature of the ordinance as it is drawn and from evidence which
may be presented as to its operation and effect.
In no case does the court admittedly consider the motive of the council in adopt-
ing an ordinance, aside from a substantiated charge that the ordinance is arbitrary,
capricious and an abuse of power!' It is settled beyond any possibility of dispute
that the matter of the wisdom or the policy of a local law, as well as any other legis-
lative act, is a matter for the exclusive determination of the legislative body and not
for the courts! 5 For this reason the particular problem considered here, the use of an
existing local power for the purpose of erecting barriers to free markets, is many times
beyond judicial scrutiny. As a practical matter, however, the economic effect and
operation of an ordinance may be proved without examination of the motive for its
adoption. Furthermore, if an ordinance can be shown to have a particular unsound
or undesirable effect in operation, it is certainly permissible to show that that effect
was the one intended by the council4 ' Consequently, it is frequently permissible
and advisable to present evidence of the intention of the council and of the interests
actually involved in the adoption of an ordinance, not for the purpose of impeaching
its validity, but for the purpose of substantiating the attack based on some other
ground 7
Judicial administration of the requirement of reasonableness in the case of reg-
ulatory as distinguished from tax measures is typified by instances concerning legis-
lative favoritism in products and method of doing business. It is arguable, of course,
that the sale of articles by the use of vending machines requires a peculiar type of
regulation in order to insure against the sale of tobacco to minors and to guard
against possible abuses resulting from the automatic feature of the sale. It is gen-
erally conceded that even a prohibitory regulation against the use of vending
machines for certain purposes is valid. For instance, in the City of Red Cloud,
"Note x8, supra.
"S. S. Kresge Co. v. Couzens, 287 N. W. 427 (Mich. 1939); see also N. J. Good Humor v. Board
of Comm'rs of Bradley Beach, xi A. (2d) 113 (N. J. 1940): "It is therefore evident that the challenged
municipal action was dictated by a purpose to shield the local shopkeepers from lawful competition,
and thus to serve private interests in contravention of common rights; and so it must be condemned
as an abuse of the police power, and therefore ultra vires."
"Thus it is said in Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. City of St. Louis, supra note 24, at 72, o6
S. W. (2d) at 438: "It is the tendency of commerce to magnify the importance of the quantity of trade;
of society (we use the term in its broad sense) to magnify the importance of life, liberty, human
happiness, and the quality of men. Motives attending the enactment of legislation in the furtherance
of either objective may be most creditable and when on proposed legislation the two interests conflict,
it is for the legislative branch of government, acting within its proper scope, not the judiciary, to choose
between the conflicting values and determine the policy of the law. We deal only with the power of
the city of St. Louis, not the expedience, wisdom, or justness of the license imposed."
"Southern Linen Supply Co. v. City of Corbin, 272 Ky. 787, 115 S. W. (2d) 321 (1938).
'1 See note 44, supra.
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Nebraska, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of vending machines for the retail.
ing of gasoline was held valid!"
On the other hand, the City of Chicago was unsuccessful in its attempt to ex-
clude paper containers from the local market area by invocation of the police power
relating to public health. It was seriously contended that the paper containers were
unsanitary and as a, matter of fact liable to contaminate the milk. The ordinance
was sustained against attack by the company producing the container-making
machinery and by the manufacturer of the containers themselves on the ground that
these persons had no proper interest in the application of the ordinance, as it did
not operate directly on them but rather on the consumer of the paper bottles.4
Upon attack by a milk distributor, however, seeking approval by the Board of Health
of the distribution of its product in the paper containers, the ordinance was inval-
idated as an unreasonable exercise of local police power, not shown to be properly
related to the protection of public health 5 °
The problem of the relation of local tax measures to interstate commerce is
essentially not different from the general relation of state laws to the same subject.
For this reason no attempt will be made here to do more than indicate the parallel
situation.51  The recent decision of Best & Co. v. Maxwell12 points out that the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution forbids any discrimination against
an interstate transaction. In that case the statute required a $250 license of a non-
resident merchant displaying goods for sale by sample in any hotel room or tem-
porary quarters whenever he did not maintain a regular place of business in North
Carolina. The Court interpreted the recent decision of McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co.5 3 as authorizing local sales taxes on interstate transactions
only where the tax did not operate to discriminate against the out-of-state dealer.
Municipalities as well as states have, in innumerable instances, enacted local tax
measures for the purpose of discouraging out-of-state dealers doing a direct sales
business by means of canvassers or drummers.5 4 While Robbins v. Shelby Taxing
District55 has, by the Berwind-White case, been limited strictly to the situation of a
fixed discriminatory license tax, nevertheless, the rather unrealistic distinction be-
tween canvassers and peddlers which had been made since the Robbins decision
seems still to obtain." The general tenor of the Berwind-White case might be inter-
preted as a resort to a practical test of discrimination, so as to sustain a tax on an
interstate transaction provided it appears to be an equalizing measure and not a
discriminatory effort. Applied in the particular case to a transaction after an inter-
,s Hawkins v. City of Red Cloud, 123 Neb. 487, 243 N. W. 431 (1932).
,Ex-Cell-O. Corp. v. City of Chicago, supra note 9.
'o Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc. v. City of Chicago, supra note 9.
"' Cf. note ig, supra.
52311 U. S. 454 (1940). 6S3o9 U. S. 33 (1940).
"In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., supra note 53, the Court noted that several
hundred such ordinances are in effect. See the Robbins case, supra note x9, and Real Silk Mills v. City
of Portland, 268 U. S. 325 (1925). "5 Supra note ig.
" Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 (1914); Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S.
95 (1919).
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state transit, its principles might easily be extended to a transaction preceding
shipment. 7
Indeed, the fundamental principle implicit in not only the Berwind-White case
but also South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers5 s may be stated
in terms of an underlying doctrine or approach which applies equally to judicial
examination of local legislation affecting non-residents, regardless of the federal
constitutional question involved in state or local legislation affecting interstate com-
merce. In the Berwind-White case is the statement:
Lying back of these decisions is the recognized danger that, to the extent that the burden
falls on economic interests without the state, it is not likely to be alleviated by those
political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely
interests within the state.
This statement might easily be formulated into a generalization as to the tenor of
judicial inquiry wherever a problem of geographical representation and legislative
action is presented, provided, of course, a proper basis for judicial action is laid.
Thus enlarged, the principle would be applicable to the problem of the effect on
non-residents of local laws having no interstate aspect whatsoever. It may easily
be said that roughly speaking such a situation presents the same danger of local
legislative action affecting extra-mural interests to which it is in no way responsible
or responsive. To be sure, the municipality is a creature of the state and a measure
of control may be exerted by resort to the state legislature. But with respect to a
matter of local concern in a home-rule jurisdiction no state legislative power exists,
and, practically speaking, such as may exist in non-home-rule states is many times
inconsequential or ineffective. The courts should have this broad precept in mind
when passing on the legality of a local ordinance with respect to its effect on non-
residents, whether they be within or without the particular state.
At least one instance is recorded of judicial invalidation of an ordinance found
upon proof to be so administered as to operate as an effective prohibition against a
non-resident doing business within the municipality. An occupational license tax
for revenue purposes was duly authorized as applied to a linen-towel service busi-
ness.60  The tax for the privilege of conducting such a business within the munic-
ipality by any person was $20o. No provision in the ordinance itself disclosed
any discrimination or even difference in its application to residents and non-
residents. One company located outside the city of Corbin, Kentucky, conducted a
business of this type servicing several nearby municipalities. The $2oo fee was ex-
acted from it and the company brought suit in the Kentucky courts complaining
of the ordinance. On the trial the plaintiff showed that the license tax not only
would so operate as to absorb more than the profit from his business done within
the City of Corbin, but also that the only resident competitor likewise subject to the
ordinance was charged but $40 for his license fee. The resident operator testified,
" Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade (1940) 53 Hnv. L. REV. 1253, 1275.
Gs 303 U. S. 177, 185 (1938). "' Supra note 53, at 47, n. 2.
" Southern Linen Supply Co. v. City of Corbin, supra note 46.
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moreover, that the $200 fee would amount to more than any of the profits which
he made from the business. Fees charged by the neighboring municipalities were
about $25. The court, in allowing the injunction against the enforcement of the
ordinance, held not only that the fee exacted was confiscatory but also that it bad
been proved by the evidence that the ordinance was passed to prohibit the business
of a non-resident.
An Illinois sustainment of an ordinance licensing and regulating automatic vend-
ing machines, though the law required that licensees be either residents or maintain
a business address in the city,61 introduces the problem of non-resident discrim-
ination in regulatory ordinances adopted pursuant to the police power. The reported
decisions are in hopeless conflict. Again the problem involves the attempt to exclude
non-residents, the closely related problem of the attempt to exercise extra-territorial
power, or an attempt by a local law to regulate a matter of interstate commerce.
Many cases indicate no distinction between the revenue or police power purposes
of a local law and most license ordinances are phrased in such a way as to invoke
either or both sources of local power. A distinction does exist in that a revenue
power may be invoked for the purpose of its resultant economic regulatory effect
whereas an implied police power may not be employed to produce revenue as such,
since power to tax must be express. Since the regulatory aspect is the important
element here, the distinction should not be of great significance except in so far
as the necessity for express authority to enact a revenue tax suggests a more limited
scope of extra-mural impact as compared to the broad possibilities from exercise of
implied police power. A rational approach should allow the local measure to stand,
in spite of an incidental effect on these three phases of geographical limitation, as
a police regulation if there is a reasonable relation in fact between the ordinance
and local health, morals, safety, or general welfare, or as a revenue tax if it is ex-
pressly authorized and is not discriminatory or confiscatory.
Many decisions fail to take this rational view and unnecessarily restrict and
hamper the scope of local ordinances. It has been held that a city has no power to
require a non-resident to pay a tax or license fee for the use of a motor vehicle
within the city limits.6 2 In C. D. Kenny Co. v. Town of Brevard,3 an ordinance
taxing wholesale merchants, not otherwise taxed, who used city streets for delivery
of goods by truck was held invalid and discriminatory as between resident and non-
resident wholesale merchants. The court said:64
The erection of trade barriers between cities and towns by the power of taxation may not
be extended beyond constitutional and statutory limits.
"'Larson v. City of Rockford, 371 Il1. 441, 21 N. E. (2d) 396 (1939).
"'City of Flora v. Borders, 342 Ill. 2o8, 173 N. E. 784 (1930). Contra: Johnson v. City of Paducah,
X47 S. W. (2d) 721 (Ky. X94'); but see Davis v. PeIfrey, 147 S. W. (2d) 723 (Ky. 1941) (distinguish-
ing the Johnson case to reach an opposite result).
as 217 N. C. 269, 7 S. E. (2d) 542 (1940); see, however, Sivertsen v. City of Menlo Park, iog P.
(2d) 928 (Cal. 1941).
"Id. at 273, 7 S. E. (2d) at 544.
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But on the other hand, a municipality does have the power to regulate the sale and
distribution of food and to provide for its inspection in the interest of public health
5
In the exercise of this power, an ordinance requiring a license of every vehicle
used for the storage or carrying of food in the city except those delivering from
duly licensed food-dealing establishments was held equally applicable to both resi-
dents and non-residents.6 Some courts have looked with favor upon ordinances
requiring a license tax from a person doing business by means of motor vehicle
within the municipality where the operator located outside the city conducts a reg-
ular system of delivery to customers within. 7 It has been suggested, however, that
in California an ordinance imposing a tax on vehicles should be made a constituent
part of the general business license ordinance and not a separate ordinance taxing
motor vehicles P
8
In general it may be said that no discrimination under police or taxing power
may be directly made against non-residents as an end in itself.0 Yet wherever
any ordinance relates to the nature of the business transacted or the manner of
conducting business within the municipality, and that business by virtue of either
its character or the manner of its conduct requires special regulation, equalizing
regulations against non-residents may properly be made.7 6
The exercise of police power by a municipality must in the absence of an express
delegation from the legislature be restricted to the territorial limits of the city. The
problem of the non-resident vendor who brings food products manufactured outside
the city within the local territory for sale has therefore perplexed the municipalities
as to means of properly protecting the consuming public by insuring that those
products are pure, unadulterated, and fit for human consumption. In the case of
a bakery located outside the city limits supplying local stores with products for sale
to the local inhabitants, a move to apply the local ordinance authorizing the city
health officer to inspect bakeries and to charge an inspection fee was held void as
an attempt to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction. 71 As already remarked, it would
seem that the rational solution should call for a recognition of valid exercise of
" Food Stores, Inc. v. City of Tulare, 12 Cal. (2d) 324, 84 P. (2d) 140 (938); Dorsa v. Santa
Clara County, 23 Cal. App. (2d) 217, 72 P. (2d) 912 (i937).
" American Baking Co. v. City of Wilmington, 370 Ill. 400, 19 N. E. (2d) 172 (1938).
"' The Emporium v. City of San Mateo, 177 Cal. 622, 171 Pac. 434 (1918). See also California
Fireproof Storage Co. v. City of Santa Monica, 2o6 Cal. 714, 275 Pac. 948 (1928); Crosswell and Co.
v. Bishopville, 172 S. C. 26, r72 S. E. 698 (934).
" Burke, Licensing the Transient Merchant-So What? (July 1934) WETERN CITY MAO. 13-14.
6It: re Hart, 36 Cal. App. 627, 172 Pac. 6io (1918); City of Watertown v. Rodenbaugh, 98 N. Y.
Supp. 885 (i9o6); City of Saginaw v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, io6 Mich. 32, 63 N. W. 985 (1895).
"° American Bakeries Co. v. City of Huntsville, 232 Ala. 612, 168 So. 88o (936); American Bakeries
Co. v. City of Sumter, 173 S. C. 94, 174 S. E. 919 (1934), appeal dismissed, 293 U. S. 523 (1934)
(higher fee charged non-resident justified as representing the higher cost of investigating his reputation,
etc.). See also State ex rel. v. Wagner, 77 Minn. 483, 8o N. W. 633 (1899); Ex parte Wade, 146 S. W
179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1912); McQtLIN, MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) §828. For a survey
of the content of local ordinances adopted for the protection of the local public by requiring registration,
photographs, fingerprints, bonds, and a period of time before issuance of a license to non-residents, see
(1940) 5 MuNICIPAL LAw J. 47.
' Ex parte Ernest, 136 S. WV. (2d) 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940).
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local regulatory power if the extra-territorial effect of the regulation is reasonably
incidental to necessary police power and the effect on residents and non-residents
is the same. 72  Perhaps the leading case in recent years agreeing with the rigid
viewpoint of the Texas case above cited is that of City of RockJord v. Hey,78 hold-
ing that the City of Rockford had no power to subject ice cream factories located
outside the city to inspection as a condition to the permission of the sale of ice
cream within the city. In the Rockjord case, however, it should be noted that the
manufacturer was licensed by the state.74
A distinction readily suggests itself between non-residents doing business within
the local area, who should naturally be subjected to the same regulations applying
to inhabitants, and an attempt on the part of the city to exercise its powers outside
the city limits. In either case, however, where the reasonable object of the ordinance
is to protect the inhabitants, by an exercise of police power properly related to the
end to be attained, and there is no evidence of an arbitrary attempt to exclude non-
residents or usurp power beyond the local jurisdiction, the ordinance should be
sustained.
Operating most heavily against non-residents is the Green River type of ordi-
nance aimed at the direct sales technique of the house-to-house canvasser. Adopted
by over 400 cities from 1935 to 1939, this enactment is a simple prohibition of
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, and itinerant merchants from going upon the premises
of private residences for the purpose of either peddling or soliciting without having
been requested or invited by the occupants. In addition to the problems relating to
interstate commerce and extra-territorial effect of such ordinances discussed above,
these regulations involve the question of the validity of such a prohibition by the
local authority. While the local authority, even under the police power, cannot
prohibit a lawful business, it may declare to be a nuisance and prohibit any business
or method of doing business which is in fact a public nuisance. A case can be
made out sustaining the nuisance character of house-to-house sales methods; never-
theless, it is debatable whether or not this nuisance is public or private. The local
police power to prohibit is naturally confined to public nuisances. The original
Green River ordinance was sustained in the case of Town of Green River v.
Bunger,715 but similar enactments have been invalidated in the states of Oklahoma,
Florida, South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Georgia, and Nebraska.70  Because of
72 See City of Norfolk v. Flynn, iox Va. 473, 44 S. E. 717 (1903). Accord: Wright v. Richmond
County, 182 Ga. 651, 186 S. E. 815 (1936); American Baking Co. v. City of Wilmington, supra note
66; State ex rel. Hogan v. Spencer, 139 Fla. 246, i9o So. 5o6 (939); Langs Creamery, Inc. v. City of
Niagara Falls, 231 N. Y. Supp. 368 (x928); Whitt v. Climm, 97 Cal. App. 131, 274 Pac. 1039 (1929);
Gilchrist Drug Co. v. City of Birmingham, 234 Ala. 204, 174 So. 6o9 (937).71Supra note so.
"Ibid. Accord: Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 267, 82 S. W. (2d) 283 (i935); Miller v. Williams, 12
F. Supp. 236 (D. Md. 1935); State v. Minneapolis, i9o Minn. 138, 251 N. W. 121 (1933).
"Supra note 7. A recent case in accord is Ex pare Lewis, 147 S. W. (2d) 478 (Tex. Crim. App.
1941).
. See (1940) 5 MUmCrPAL. LAW J. 23, 46, 84, and cases collected in Report of the Committee on
Ordinance and Ordinance Enforcement, in MUNICIPALMES AND TH-E LAw im AamoN (Nat. Inst. Mun.
Law Officers, 1940).
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the debatable ground on which these ordinances are based their economic effect as
market barriers may well be considered by the courts as well as by the local city
council.
Finally, a form of local barrier law may be found in the general tendency in local
affairs to give preference to local labor or local products in government purchases
or construction. These ordinances have taken the form of direct residence or
citizenship requirements and are generally free from any attack based on federal
constitutional limitation. In New York it has recently been held that a three-year
residence requirement to establish eligibility for local civil service employment is
valid.77 In the conduct of local government business the municipality and the state
alone are concerned.78
While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to propose any concrete solution
for market-barrier evils arising from local legislation, it may be suggested that as a
general rule the economic desirability of the local ordinances, in so far as they operate
on local groups, may be safely left as a matter for the exclusive jurisdiction of the
city council, which, at least theoretically, represents all interested and affected per-
sons. In the case of local legislation which by design or effect sets up a tariff wall
around a local marketing area to insulate it from traders from other parts of the
country, a problem of importance to the national unity is presented and requires
attention beyond that likely from the local enacting body. The courts in review of
such local laws may be addressed upon matters of reasonableness, arbitrary classi-
fication, extra-territorial operation, or discrimination against interstate commerce, in
accordance with the principles above illustrated. Wherever such judicial inquiry
will prove ineffective, congressional action may in some measure be effective. On
the other hand, a note of warning might well be sounded in view of the extensive
literature which is rapidly growing up in this field, and in view of the intensive
drive toward national unification of all economic resources as a defense measure.
The study of the barrier effect of local as well as state legislation should not be
allowed to develop into a witch hunt which would tend to distort and proscribe
many forms of reasonable and necessary local equalizing laws, or necessary pro-
tective measures enacted in the course of the exercise of legitimate police power.
7 Mullins v. Kern, 28o N. Y. 543, 2o N. E. (2d) 1o (1939).
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914); McAllister, Cour, Congress and Trade Barriers
(1940) 16 IND. L. J. 144, 164-z65.
